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Summary 
 
A key challenge to the routine, safe operation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is 
the development of detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems to aid the UAS pilot in remaining 
“well clear” of nearby aircraft. The goal of this study is to investigate the effect of alerting 
criteria and pilot response delay on the safety and performance of UAS DAA systems in 
the context of routine civil UAS operations in the National Airspace System (NAS). A 
NAS-wide fast-time simulation study was conducted to assess UAS DAA system 
performance with a large number of encounters and a broad set of DAA alerting and 
guidance system parameters. Three attributes of the DAA system were controlled as 
independent variables in the study to conduct trade-off analyses: UAS trajectory 
prediction method (dead-reckoning vs. intent-based), alerting time threshold (related to 
predicted time to LoWC), and alerting distance threshold (related to predicted Horizontal 
Miss Distance, or HMD). A set of metrics, such as the percentage of true positive, false 
positive, and missed alerts, based on signal detection theory and analysis methods 
utilizing the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves were proposed to evaluate 
the safety and performance of DAA alerting and guidance systems and aid development 
of DAA system performance standards. The effect of pilot response delay on the 
performance of DAA systems was evaluated using a DAA alerting and guidance model 
and a pilot model developed to support this study. A total of 18 fast-time simulations 
were conducted with nine different DAA alerting threshold settings and two different 
trajectory prediction methods, using recorded radar traffic from current Visual Flight 
Rules (VFR) operations, and supplemented with DAA-equipped UAS traffic based on 
mission profiles modeling future UAS operations. 
Results indicate DAA alerting distance threshold has a greater effect on DAA system 
performance than DAA alerting time threshold or ownship trajectory prediction method. 
Further analysis on the alert lead time (time in advance of predicted loss of well clear at 
which a DAA alert is first issued) indicated a strong positive correlation between alert 
lead time and DAA system performance (i.e. the ability of the UAS pilot to maneuver the 
unmanned aircraft to remain well clear). While bigger distance thresholds had beneficial 
effects on alert lead time and missed alert rate, it also generated a higher rate of false 
alerts. In the design and development of DAA alerting and guidance systems, therefore, 
the positive and negative effects of false alerts and missed alerts should be carefully 
considered to achieve acceptable alerting system performance by balancing false and 
missed alerts. 
The results and methodology presented in this study are expected to help 
stakeholders, policymakers and standards committees define the appropriate setting of 
DAA system parameter thresholds for UAS that ensure safety while minimizing 
operational impacts to the NAS and equipage requirements for its users before DAA 
operational performance standards can be finalized. 
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I. Introduction 
NE of the most critical challenges to full integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS) is the requirement to “see and 
avoid” other aircraft, which is an important contributor to today’s safe air traffic 
operations.1 Lacking an on-board pilot to perform “see and avoid,” UAS will require 
Detect-And-Avoid (DAA) systems to remain “well clear” of other proximate airborne 
traffic to safely operate in civil airspace. While a number of potential UAS DAA system 
architectures have been proposed (e.g., ground-based vs. airborne, automated vs. pilot-
in-the-loop), all DAA systems would be expected to perform the following basic 
functions: (1) detect and track proximate airborne aircraft, (2) evaluate the collision 
hazard of each intruder aircraft by predicting their future trajectories and comparing them 
against the predicted trajectory of the UAS, (3) prioritize the intruders and (if necessary) 
alert/declare that action is necessary to avoid a predicted loss of well clear, and (4) 
determine maneuver guidance to resolve the situation. The UAS DAA system 
investigated in this memorandum relies on the UAS pilot to assess maneuver guidance 
provided by the DAA system and to determine appropriate action(s) to remain well clear 
of other aircraft. 
 Prior research has assessed UAS pilot ability to maintain “well clear” under a 
variety of UAS Ground Control Station (GCS) display and maneuver guidance concepts 
using Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) simulations.2,3 These studies provided the data to refine 
the UAS DAA display, guidance and alerting concepts, and to develop UAS pilot 
response models for use in fast-time simulations and Monte Carlo analyses. While HITL 
simulations are critical to the development of UAS DAA system performance standards, 
due to cost, schedule and manpower constraints, they are generally only able to assess 
the performance of a DAA system under a limited set of operating conditions and system 
parameters. It is necessary to complement these prior studies with additional research 
addressing a broader range of operating conditions and system parameters to develop a 
full understanding of how DAA system attributes affect the performance of DAA systems 
in the context of routine civil UAS operations in the NAS. 
In this effort, a fast-time simulation study was conducted to assess UAS DAA system 
performance with a large number of encounters and across a broader set of DAA 
alerting and guidance system parameters than was employed in the aforementioned 
HITL simulations. In this study, encounters between UAS and other aircraft are the result 
of simulated UAS operations interacting with recorded VFR traffic in a NAS-wide 
simulation. Eighteen UAS mission profiles developed under prior work were used in this 
study to simulate a variety of UAS aircraft conducting an array of possible future UAS 
missions, including: point-to-point transport, regional mapping/monitoring, and patrol.4 
Conventional, manned aircraft traffic operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) was 
based on track recordings of radar facilities from across the continental United States 
NAS. Ultimately, each simulation included tens of thousands of DAA-equipped UAS 
operations interacting with tens of thousands of conventional VFR operations. The 
resulting set of encounters between UAS and VFR aircraft were used to investigate the 
relationships between UAS DAA system performance, alerting parameters, pilot 
response delay, and trajectory prediction methods. 
A UAS DAA system alerting and guidance model was developed as part of this effort 
and includes a simple pilot response model based on prior HITL simulation. The 
following attributes of the DAA system were controlled as independent variables in the 
experiment: 1) UAS trajectory prediction method (state-based vs. intent-based), 2) alert 
time threshold (related to predicted time to LoWC), and 3) alert distance threshold 
(related to predicted Horizontal Miss Distance, or HMD). Further, the alert lead time 
(time prior to predicted loss of well clear that an encounter met the alerting criteria and 
was communicated to the pilot) was also investigated to understand its relationship to 
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the ability of the UAS pilot to respond to an alert and maneuver to remain well clear. 
While metrics traditionally employed in alerting systems (e.g. missed alert rate, false 
alert rate, etc.) are important to understanding system performance tradeoffs, they 
provide little insight into selection of appropriate system parameters to achieve desired 
DAA system performance characteristics. 
This research proposes several potential metrics and methods for systematically 
evaluating the performance of a DAA system with respect to alerting and the ability of 
the pilot using the DAA system to remain well clear. This study not only investigates the 
trade-offs and sensitivities between DAA system attributes, but additionally provides 
metrics in terms of predictability and resolution ability to more directly address effective 
system parameter selection. Understanding alerting system parameters and their impact 
on safety and performance is essential for establishing the requirements and associated 
standards for DAA systems. Therefore, the purpose of the present research is to 
quantify the effectiveness and performance of DAA alerting and guidance systems to 
support the Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA systems to 
enable safe operations of UAS in civil airspace. The results and methodology are 
expected to help stakeholders, policymakers and standards committees define the 
appropriate setting of DAA system parameter thresholds for UAS that ensure safety 
while minimizing operational impacts to the NAS and equipage requirements for its users 
before DAA operational performance standards can be finalized. 
To provide the context for understanding the basis of this work, the following section 
provides a brief background of prior research. Section III describes DAA alerting and 
guidance systems, the definition of UAS well clear, and DAA alerting criteria modeled in 
this effort. To address the need for metrics leading to DAA system parameter selection, 
Section IV proposes a set of performance metrics and analysis methods for evaluating 
the performance of DAA alerting and guidance systems. Section V describes the 
simulation models and platform including traffic scenarios used to conduct this research 
and details the simulation experiment design. Section VI discusses simulation results, 
and Section VII concludes with a summary. 
 
II. Background 
In the United States, RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228), a consortium of 
government, industry and academia, is currently working toward establishing Minimum 
Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA systems equipment and 
Command and Control (C2) Data Link systems to support civil UAS operations in 
transition airspace from/to Class A airspace under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR).5 
Although some concepts for future DAA systems have been researched for UAS,6 a 
DAA system for use on unmanned aircraft has not yet been certified or implemented. 
Significant design, evaluation, verification and validation efforts are required before final 
MOPS for DAA systems can be developed. NASA is conducting research to evaluate 
and quantify the operational performance for DAA systems and algorithms for supporting 
MOPS development through fast-time simulation and HITL simulation experiments.7,8  
The UAS DAA alerting and guidance subsystems are intended to assist the UAS 
pilot in identifying nearby aircraft representing potential collision hazards and to provide 
the UAS pilot with guidance to select an appropriate maneuver to remain well clear of 
the threat aircraft, respectively. DAA systems designed with such “suggestive” guidance 
for the UAS pilot are typically composed of four subsystems: 1) a surveillance 
subsystem, 2) an alerting subsystem, 3) a maneuver guidance subsystem, and 4) a 
traffic display subsystem. The surveillance subsystem detects and tracks proximate 
intruder aircraft with on-board sensors and a tracker (not necessarily on-board the 
 4 
aircraft). After processing the surveillance track data (including prioritizing intruder 
aircraft), an alerting subsystem evaluates tracks to assess the risk that “well-clear” 
separation will be lost and alerts the pilot accordingly. If a threat is identified, a guidance 
subsystem determines an appropriate response and provides maneuver guidance to the 
pilot through a traffic display subsystem. A traffic display subsystem at the ground 
control station provides pilots with visual traffic information and aids them in selecting 
and executing an avoidance maneuver. This study focuses on evaluating the 
performance of DAA alerting and guidance subsystems, and Section III provides more 
information about the alerting and guidance subsystems. 
The performance of DAA systems can be affected by the volume of the alert zone 
which is defined by alerting subsystem parameters such as alert criteria and thresholds. 
Larger alert zones generally lead to earlier alerts (i.e., alerts are generated further in 
advance of predicted loss of well clear). While earlier alerts may provide the UAS pilot 
more time to assess maneuver guidance and coordinate a maneuver with ATC, a larger 
alert zone also leads to an increase in the number of false alerts. An excessive number 
of false alerts can be a nuisance to UAS pilots and ATC due to required coordination of 
otherwise unnecessary UAS maneuvers and may impact air traffic controller workload, 
and thus their ability to provide separation service to other IFR aircraft. On the other 
hand, if the alert zone is too small, which creates a higher rate of missed alerts, there 
might not be sufficient space or time for a UAS pilot to determine and command a 
maneuver to avoid a predicted conflict (i.e., a loss of well clear) even though it might 
reduce false/nuisance alerts. Balancing false and missed alerts to achieve acceptable 
DAA system performance is a key design challenge for DAA systems builders. More 
information about the chosen analysis methodology and a set of proposed DAA system 
performance metrics are described in Section IV. 
The alerting efficacy of a DAA system is sensitive to the encounter geometry 
between UAS and potential threat aircraft at the time of alerts. In deciding on appropriate 
alerting criteria, the relative range and bearing angle between aircraft at the time of 
alerts should also be considered. To investigate the relationship between encounter 
geometry and alerting thresholds, simulations were conducted without imposing sensor 
field-of-regard constraints on tracks used to evaluate whether or not alerting criteria were 
met. Then, the proportion of alerts was determined at which both ownship and intruder 
aircraft were within a specified minimum surveillance volume defined by a detection 
range, horizontal and vertical fields of regard. If only small percent of threat aircraft, 
given a surveillance volume, can be detected with a selected alerting criteria, the alerting 
criteria or the required surveillance volume should be re-evaluated and adjusted. 
Therefore, the alerting criteria must also be based in part on the encounter 
characteristics. However, the encounter characteristics at the time of alerts that UAS are 
likely to have with other aircraft, particularly with VFR aircraft in transition airspace, are 
not well understood yet. Prior studies investigating DAA systems with Monte Carlo 
simulations have relied on encounter models based on the interactions between VFR 
aircraft operating in the NAS, implicitly assuming UAS operations in the NAS will closely 
resemble current VFR operations.9,10 Therefore, one of the goals in this research is to 
explore the encounter characteristics between aircraft, such as relative horizontal range 
and bearing angle, when DAA alerts are issued. Analysis of UAS-VFR encounters 
derived from the mission-based UAS operations in this paper complement prior 
encounter-model based studies and serve to reduce risk associated with assumptions 
about the character of future UAS operations. The results are presented in Section VI.A. 
The alerting subsystem parameters and performance requirements are selected to 
achieve a desired level of safety and to satisfy a certain level of operational performance 
(e.g., an acceptable number of false alerts and missed alerts). This level of safety is, 
broadly speaking, dependent upon two important variables: 1) the alert rate at which a 
UAS encounters threat aircraft that are projected to lose “well clear,” and 2) the 
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effectiveness of a DAA system in mitigating those encounters. In the safety-critical 
domain of aviation, reducing missed alerts is generally more important than reducing 
false/nuisance alerts because of the very high cost of a missed alert resulting in a 
potentially catastrophic consequence (e.g., a collision). Therefore, it is important to 
consider the cost of missed alerts versus that of false or nuisance alerts when selecting 
the alerting thresholds for DAA systems. Defining the alerting threshold or criteria 
improperly could result in operational impacts to the NAS or unreasonable sensor 
requirements. Therefore, the challenge is to identify acceptable alerting thresholds for 
UAS DAA systems that ensure safety while minimizing operational impacts to the NAS. 
Simulation results are then assessed by investigating the relationship between the rates 
of false alerts and missed alerts in Section VI.B. 
For DAA systems based on “suggestive” guidance (as suggested by SC-228), the 
UAS pilot makes the final determination of the resolution maneuver to execute to avoid a 
predicted loss of safe separation from other nearby aircraft or hazards.11 To remain well 
clear of threat aircraft, the pilot must have adequate time to assess the threat, evaluate 
maneuver options, coordinate the selected maneuver with ATC, and initiate a maneuver 
to mitigate the threat.1 Thus, an important feature of a DAA alerting and guidance 
system is the alert lead time provided to the pilot when a threat to well clear is identified. 
This study examines how the alert lead time is affected by the setting of DAA system 
parameter thresholds and how the alert lead time and pilot response delay affect the 
performance of DAA systems. To model the time delay associated with these pilot 
actions and cognitive processes, a pilot response delay model was developed for use in 
this fast-time simulation experiment, based on results from prior HITL studies.3 The 
simulation results about DAA guidance performance are presented in Section VI.C. 
 
III. Overview of a DAA Alerting and Guidance System 
Pilots onboard aircraft flying under VFR are required to remain well clear of other 
aircraft by complying with the particular regulatory rules addressing right of way, to 
remain “well clear”, and operating not so close to other aircraft (Title 14 Code of Federal 
Regulations (14 CFR), Part 91, §91.111, §91.113, and §91.181). In the absence of an 
onboard pilot, a UAS is required to be equipped with a system to provide the UAS pilot a 
means of compliance with these rules.  
The FAA-sponsored Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) Workshop1 defined a SAA system as 
“the capability of a UAS to remain well clear from and avoid collisions with other airborne 
traffic.” To fulfill the regulatory requirement to “see and avoid,” a SAA system is 
comprised of a Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) system and a Collision Avoidance (CA) system 
to provide two critical services for UAS to maintain appropriate separation from other 
aircraft: 1) keep the aircraft “well clear” of other traffic and 2) avoid near-midair collisions 
(NMAC) with other aircraft within a relatively short time horizon. RTCA SC-228 defines 
DAA as a system function that enables the unmanned aircraft to maneuver within a 
sufficient timeframe to remain well clear of other airborne traffic.  
There are three main sub-functions of a DAA system that may significantly affect its 
performance. They are: 1) the surveillance function to detect and track intruder aircraft; 
2) the threat alerting function to evaluate the tracks and declare that action is needed to 
prevent a threat aircraft from causing a well-clear violation; and 3) the guidance function 
to aid the UAS pilot in determining a maneuver to resolve a predicted well-clear violation. 
The DAA surveillance system provides a means for the UAS pilot to electronically “see” 
(detect and track) both cooperative (i.e., transponder-equipped) and non-cooperative 
aircraft. The DAA alerting and guidance system provides a means: to alert and aid the 
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UAS pilot in prioritizing potential traffic conflicts (i.e., a loss of well clear) and to assist in 
deciding upon and performing a well-clear maneuver. 
DAA system performance relies on a combination of surveillance sensors to collect 
data on the state of intruder aircraft and a set of algorithms that trigger an alert for the 
UAS pilot at the ground control station and support the pilot in determining an 
appropriate guidance maneuver to avoid a loss of well clear. Therefore, the ability of a 
DAA system to mitigate a risk of losing well clear with other intruder aircraft depends 
upon important independent factors such as DAA look-ahead time (which is limited by 
surveillance range), the definition of “well clear,” trajectory prediction methods, and DAA 
alerting thresholds. Tradeoffs between the DAA system design parameters and 
performance metrics should be investigated to develop MOPS for UAS DAA systems. 
For example, it will be important to explore which of the alert declaration times are 
excessive and lead to nuisance alerts and which of the alert declaration times are short 
and provide insufficient time for pilots to coordinate maneuvers with air traffic controllers 
(ATC) and execute the maneuvers. In a previous study,12 the encounter characteristics 
and time to well-clear violation at which aircraft are detected were investigated with a set 
of different surveillance volumes in order to identify minimum surveillance sensor 
requirements for detecting a given percentage of intruding aircraft. However, the effects 
of DAA system parameters such as alerting thresholds and pilot response delay on the 
overall performance and effectiveness of DAA systems were not investigated. 
Air traffic controllers do not have primary responsibility for separation between 
aircraft flying under IFR and aircraft flying under VFR in Class E and transition airspace; 
ATC simply provides traffic advisory and safety alert services to the aircraft on a 
workload permitting basis. Therefore, UAS flying under IFR should be able and equipped 
to initiate a maneuver to remain well clear of proximate VFR aircraft. As specified by 
current regulations that apply to manned aircraft, UAS pilots may still request trajectory 
changes to remain well clear from other aircraft.9 Such requests do not require a legal 
loss of separation (e.g., 5nmi horizontally and 1000ft vertically in enroute airspace) to 
have occurred. They only depend on the definition of well clear or the existence of pilot-
identified situations like severe weather encounters or emergencies. The following 
section describes a proposed quantitative definition of well clear by RTCA SC-228 and 
important parameters that may affect the performance of DAA systems.  
A. UAS Well-Clear Definition  
The definition of UAS well clear in this section is used to support DAA performance 
evaluation. In order to develop DAA alerting and guidance systems to predict potential 
violations of well clear and perform maneuvers to remain well clear of other aircraft, the 
term “well clear” needs to be defined quantitatively (unambiguous and implementable 
definition) to provide a means to evaluate system performance objectively.  
“Well clear” is defined as a state and trajectory relative to another aircraft that would 
not normally cause the pilot of either aircraft to initiate a collision avoidance (CA) 
maneuver.1 Therefore, remaining well clear refers to maintaining airborne separation 
minima as like distance-based ATC separation standards. Performing DAA functions 
correctly means remaining an appropriate distance and/or time from other aircraft by 
maintaining the well clear separation criteria. Failing to do so is called a loss of well clear 
(LoWC). The well clear separation criteria depends upon many factors, including the 
relative encounter geometry between aircraft and the performance characteristics of 
each aircraft. Therefore, it is necessary to define an explicit and quantitative definition of 
well clear so that a UAS will be able to detect and avoid other aircraft within a sufficient 
timeframe to remain well clear from intruder aircraft.  
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At the recent Sense-and-Avoid Science and Research Panel (SARP) workshop, 
several definitions of “well clear” were investigated. The effects of different well-clear 
definitions on UAS detect-and-avoid system operations were investigated in a previous 
study.13 In the present study, a definition of well clear recommended by RTCA SC-228 is 
used. It was proposed based on the unmitigated risk of collision after crossing of the 
well-clear separation boundary from a set of random encounters between VFR aircraft 
under 18,000 ft.9 “Modified tau,” as defined in Eq. (1), is used, similar to the TCAS II 
alerting definition, in order to assure adequate separation because the previous 
parameter (i.e., range tau) did not give sufficient alerting time to avoid a LoWC, or even 
an NMAC, when the intruder performed a sudden acceleration that increased the closure 
rate (e.g., a turn).14,15 To provide protection in encounters with very slow rates of closure, 
a new parameter, “distance modification” (DMOD), was added to the traditional range 
tau to provide a minimum range at which to alert regardless of the calculated value of 
range tau.  
                                              (1) 
                                             
where rxy = horizontal range and  = horizontal range rate. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic of well-clear definition. 
 
A loss of well clear generally occurs when two aircraft are projected to be within a 
certain horizontal and vertical distance from each other and the time to this event is less 
than a particular time threshold. To calculate the predicted horizontal range at the time of 
closest point of approach (i.e., horizontal miss distance), dead reckoning is used to 
predict the intruder aircraft's future positions. The following proposed definition of well 
clear is taken from a recent RTCA SC-228 workshop. Eq. (2) shows a horizontal criterion 
and a vertical criterion. Both criteria must be satisfied for an encounter to be considered 
a well-clear violation. SC-228 established the thresholds for well clear as given in Table 
1.16 A loss of UAS Well Clear occurs when 
 
                                                       (2) 
where 
  𝜏!"# =  Modified Tau (sec) 
  𝜏∗!"# =  Modified Tau Threshold(sec) 
  𝐻𝑀𝐷 =  𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ (𝐶𝑃𝐴) 
  𝐻𝑀𝐷∗ =  𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
  𝑑! =  𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 (𝑓𝑡) 
  ℎ∗ =  𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
τmod = −
(rxy2 −DMOD2 )
rxy !rxy
for rxy ≥ DMOD
=                0          for rxy < DMOD
!rxy
[0 ≤ τmod ≤ τ *mod and HMD ≤ HMD*] and [−h* ≤ dh ≤ h*]
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Table 1. Parameters and threshold values for defining UAS Well Clear. 
 
Parameter 𝜏!"#∗  (sec) DMOD (ft) HMD* (ft) h* (ft) 
Value 35 sec 4000 ft 4000 ft 450 ft 
B. DAA Trajectory Prediction Method  
The DAA track prediction function takes the current state data for the ownship and 
track data for all intruders at a common time of applicability and extrapolates the states 
and tracks into the future. For ownship and intruder track prediction, the well-known 
dead-reckoning (DR) based prediction method or the flight-plan (FP) based prediction 
method can be used. In the DR prediction method, each trajectory prediction is 
extrapolated from an aircraft’s current position assuming constant horizontal and vertical 
velocities based upon the current estimated aircraft state. In the FP-based prediction 
method, each trajectory prediction is developed from the aircraft’s flight plan (intent) 
information, rather than extrapolating the aircraft’s state information. In this study, the 
intruder trajectory is generated based on the DR prediction method because the 
intruder’s flight plan information is not typically available to ownship aircraft. However, 
both DR and FP trajectory prediction methods for ownship are investigated to assess the 
impact of trajectory prediction methods on the DAA alerting performance metrics. It is 
hypothesized that the trajectory uncertainty stemming from the lack of intent information 
for VFR intruder aircraft (i.e., DR trajectory prediction) will lead to more frequent 
false/nuisance alerts. Conversely, it is hypothesized that the FP-based prediction 
method will lead to fewer nuisance alerts for intruders along the ownship’s trajectory 
prior to a planned turn and will lead to longer alert lead times for intruders that are not on 
the ownship’s current trajectory but are projected to encounter its planned trajectory. 
C. DAA Alerting Thresholds  
A DAA alerting system must alert traffic to the UAS pilot that is projected to cross the 
UAS well-clear volume defined in the previous section within a specified time threshold. 
In order to give an alert on a predicted loss of well clear with an intruder aircraft to the 
UAS pilot within a sufficient timeframe, alerting parameters and threshold values for 
each parameter should be defined and investigated. The DAA alerting thresholds define 
those conditions at which the alerting system declares that an action is needed to 
preclude a threat aircraft from causing a loss of well clear. At the point at which the 
system issues an alert, the pilot must focus his/her attention on the potential threat 
aircraft to see if an action is necessary. If an action is necessary, the pilot must 
determine a maneuver based on his/her judgment with the support of the DAA guidance 
system and start coordinating with ATC. After a response delay from a DAA alert, the 
pilot will likely determine a maneuver and command a resolution maneuver to the 
unmanned aircraft. Therefore, the DAA alerting threshold should be provided with 
sufficient time for the pilot to assess the situation, determine a maneuver, and coordinate 
a maneuver with ATC. 
In a DAA system, the surveillance system component processes the data received 
from the sensors and generates tracks for each detected intruder aircraft. After 
processing track information, the DAA alerting function produces and evaluates the 
future trajectory of each detected intruder aircraft to predict whether there will be a loss 
of well clear on the generated future trajectories of ownship and intruder aircraft and how 
long it will take to reach the point at which a loss of well clear is predicted.  
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Each DAA alert involves a specified alerting threshold. The DAA thresholds can be 
considered as an alerting zone, which can be defined with time- and distance-based 
criteria like the definition of well clear. Therefore, one of the important alerting 
parameters is the time at which the alerting system should issue an alert. The alert must 
be presented before the intruder aircraft penetrates the LoWC boundary specified in the 
previous section. In this study, the Estimated Time to LoWC (ETL) is defined as a time-
based DAA alerting parameter. The ETL depends on the size of the LoWC boundary 
defined by variable time-based (τmod) and distance-based parameters (DMOD, HMD, dh) 
since it calculates the time to LoWC. The distance-based parameters are also important 
in defining alerting criteria. In the following, it is assumed that HMD* = DMOD in all 
cases because if the HMD threshold is different from DMOD, then alerts may oscillate on 
and off with an un-accelerating ownship and intruder, which is an undesired behavior. 
The DAA alert is issued when an intruder is predicted to be within the following alert 
threshold at any point in time within a specified alerting time threshold (ETL*). The 
threshold values of the alerting parameters define the triggering criteria for initiating DAA 
alerts, and these alerting thresholds are used to define the trade space for when alerts 
are and are not to be generated. The definition of the alerting thresholds and the variable 
parameters (𝜏!"#∗ , 𝐷𝑀𝑂𝐷, 𝐻𝑀𝐷∗, and ℎ∗) are specified in Eq (3).  
 
        0 ≤ 𝜏!"# ≤ 𝜏!"#∗ ] . 𝑎𝑛𝑑. [𝐻𝑀𝐷 ≤ 𝐻𝑀𝐷∗  . 𝑎𝑛𝑑. −ℎ∗ ≤ 𝑑! ≤ ℎ∗  at tf                    (3)  
where tf is a future point in time within ETL*. 
 
All three conditions must be true at the same point in the trajectory prediction, and 
the alerting time threshold (i.e., ETL*) must also be true to declare an alert. For example, 
if the intruder and ownship are predicted to be within the spatial and temporal volume of 
well clear (specified in Eq (2) for UAS Well-Clear definition: 𝜏!"#∗  = 35 sec, 𝐷𝑀𝑂𝐷 = 4000 
ft, 𝐻𝑀𝐷∗ = 4000 ft, and ℎ∗=450 ft) within the next 55 seconds, a DAA alert will be issued. 
By varying these alerting parameters, the size of the alerting zone can be adjusted to 
meet the performance and safety requirements for DAA alerting and guidance systems.  
Figure 2 shows a schematic of DAA alerting logic. The intruder trajectory is 
generated based on a dead-reckoning prediction method, and the ownship trajectory is 
generated using either a DR-based prediction method or a FP-based prediction method, 
depending on the availability of the ownship’s flight plan. The intruder trajectory is 
compared with the trajectory of the unmanned ownship aircraft to evaluate if there is a 
potential LoWC at each future time step in a pair-wise comparison manner. A DAA alert 
is issued if a LoWC is predicted to occur within the specified alerting time threshold. 
However, due to the inherent uncertainty of the intended flight trajectory of the intruder, 
the predicted LoWC may or may not occur in the future, even without a conflict 
resolution maneuver. 
The performance of a DAA system will be dependent upon how DAA alerting time 
and distance thresholds are defined. In general, using large DAA threshold values to 
avoid a well-clear violation with sufficient time might cause a large number of nuisance 
alerts, resulting in a large number of unnecessary maneuvers of unmanned aircraft and 
corresponding disruptions to ATC to coordinate the resolution maneuvers. On the other 
hand, small DAA alerting threshold values might reduce nuisance alerts but might not be 
sufficient to avoid LoWC. Due to the uncertainty inherent in the trajectory intent 
information of intruder aircraft, the DMOD, HMD*, and h* values play an important role in 
the safety and performance of DAA systems. While the minimum alerting thresholds 
could also differ based on sensor or aircraft performance, this study focuses on DAA 
alerting distance and time thresholds. 
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Figure 2. Schematic of DAA alerting thresholds.  
 
RTCA SC-228 is currently defining two different types of DAA alerts (i.e., corrective 
alert and warning alert) based on the estimated time to LoWC and evaluating candidate 
DAA alerting threshold values as shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. DAA Alert Summary. 
 
 
The DAA corrective alert is intended to be provided in sufficient time for the UAS pilot 
to assess the situation and determine an appropriate action, to start coordination with 
ATC, and to command/execute a maneuver to remain well clear from threat aircraft. The 
point at which a corrective alert occurs defines the DAA threshold. On the other hand, 
the DAA warning alert is intended to inform the pilot that immediate action is required to 
remain well clear. The warning alert necessitates immediate pilot awareness and a 
prompt ownship maneuver. The DAA corrective alert and warning alert will be triggered 
based on the threshold values in Table 2. The time threshold values specified in the SC-
228 draft MOPS are based on the minimum time for a pilot to respond to an alert 
(approximately 15 sec), coordinate with ATC (approximately 10 sec), and maneuver to 
remain well clear (approximately 30 sec). If the “Must Not Alert” criteria are met, the DAA 
alerting system must not issue any alert to the pilot. In this study, a set of alerting 
	  Corrective Alert Warning Alert 
Alert Level Caution Warning 
M
us
t A
le
rt 
Th
re
sh
ol
d 
Within Time 55 sec 25 sec τ!"#∗  35 sec 35 sec 
DMOD and HMD∗ 0.66 nm 0.66 nm h∗ 450 ft 450 ft 
M
us
t N
ot
 A
le
rt 
Th
re
sh
ol
d 
More than time 75 sec 35 sec 
τ!"#∗  35 sec 35 sec 
DMOD and HMD∗ 1.5 nm 1.5 nm h∗ 450 ft 450 ft 
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threshold values were selected between the “Must Alert” and “Must Not Alert” threshold 
values to conduct trade-off and sensitivity analysis of these threshold values on the 
performance metrics proposed in the next section, Section IV. 
IV. Performance Metrics and Trade-off Analysis Method 
The overall performance of a DAA alerting and guidance system can be assessed in 
terms of its ability to predict/declare threat aircraft accurately within a sufficient 
timeframe for UAS pilot to respond, coordinate with ATC, and initiate a maneuver to 
successfully avoid projected LoWC. This section outlines the classification of DAA alerts 
and presents a list of metrics to evaluate the performance of DAA alerting and guidance 
systems. 
A. Categorization of DAA Alerts 
DAA alerting performance can be considered as a two-class prediction problem 
(binary classification) in which the outcomes are either positive (i.e., it is predicted that 
there will be a loss of well clear within a specified look-ahead time) or negative (i.e., it is 
predicted that there will be no loss of well clear within the look-ahead time). The four 
outcomes can be formulated in a 2x2 confusion matrix as in Table 3. Therefore, a DAA 
alert in this study can be classified into four possible alerts: true positive, false negative, 
false positive, and true negative. A true positive (referred to as a true alert in this study) 
occurs when the alerting system correctly predicts that, without intervention by the pilot 
and/or controller) there will be a LoWC within a look-ahead time. A false negative 
(referred to as a missed alert in this study) occurs when the alerting system predicts that 
there will not be a LoWC, when in reality, without mitigation by the pilot/controller, a 
LoWC will occur. A false positive (referred to as a false or nuisance alert in this study) 
occurs when the alerting system incorrectly predicts that there will be a LoWC. A true 
negative (referred to as a correct rejection in this study) occurs when the alerting system 
correctly predicts that there will not be a LoWC. Depending on the estimated time to 
LoWC at the time of a DAA alert, a level of “alert urgency”— on time or delayed —is 
assigned to further categorize the alerting results. 
 
Table 3. DAA alert confusion matrix. 
 Unmitigated True Condition 
 LoWC exists 
(Positive) 
No LoWC exists 
(Negative) 
DAA 
System 
Prediction 
Response 
LoWC will 
occur: Alert 
(Positive) 
True Positive 
(TP) 
False Positive 
(FP) 
Total Number of 
Alerts 
(TP + FP) 
LoWC will not 
occurs: No 
Alert 
(Negative) 
False Negative 
(FN) 
True Negative 
(TN) 
Total Number of 
No Alert Events 
(TN+FN) 
 Total Number of 
Positive LoWC 
Events 
(TP+FN) 
Total Number of 
Negative LoWC 
Events 
(FP+TN) 
Total Number of 
Intruding Events 
 
(TP+FP+FN+TN) 
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B. Performance Metrics for DAA Alerting and Guidance Systems 
This section lists and describes the performance metrics used to evaluate DAA 
alerting and guidance systems in this study. The effects of independent factors (e.g., 
different alerting thresholds) on the safety (in terms of number of LoWC) and 
performance metrics of a DAA system are evaluated, as shown in Tables 4 and 5.  
It is important to alert the UAS pilot to any potential LoWC early enough that s/he can 
successfully avoid losing well clear. For example, even a true positive alert is not useful 
if it is presented with insufficient time to avoid LoWC. Therefore, when measuring the 
performance of DAA alerting and avoidance systems, it is necessary to consider whether 
or not a maneuver is executed prior to a predicted LoWC, and the predicted LoWC is 
successfully avoided. 
Operational metrics such as the alert rate are used to measure how disruptive the 
system is to normal operations. Additional metrics such as the proportion of delayed 
alerts and the proportion of maneuvers triggered by false alerts are also proposed and 
measured to evaluate the performance of DAA alerting and guidance systems in this 
study. 
 
Table 4. Performance metrics for DAA alerting systems. 
 
Performance Metrics Description 
P(True positive alerts | 
All issued alerts) 
Proportion of true positive alerts to all alerts 
(Positive Predictive Value) = 𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 
P(False positive alerts | 
All issued alerts) 
Proportion of false positive alerts to all alerts 
(False Discovery Rate) = 𝐹𝑃𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 
P(Alert was issued | 
LoWC exists) 
 
Proportion of true positive alerts to all positive condition cases 
(True Positive Rate) = 𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 
P(Alert was issued | 
No LoWC exists) 
Proportion of false positive alerts to all negative condition cases 
(False Positive Rate) = 𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 
P(No alert was issued | 
LoWC exists) 
Proportion of false negative alerts to all positive condition cases 
(Missed Alert Rate) = 𝐹𝑁𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 
Alert lead time until 
LoWC 
Average time until LoWC at which a DAA alert is first issued 
(specifically for true positive alerts) 
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Table 5. Performance metrics for DAA guidance systems. 
Performance 
Metrics Sub-Metrics Description 
DAA Success 
Rate = P(No 
LoWC occurs | 
Alert was 
issued) 
 
Proportion of alerts that eventually resulted in no LoWC among 
all alerts (with/without a maneuver) = 
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑛𝑜 𝐿𝑜𝑊𝐶𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠  
 
Resolution 
Maneuver 
Success 
Rate = 
P(Successful 
Resolution | 
Resolution 
was issued) 
Proportion of resolutions that avoided LoWC among all 
commanded resolutions = 
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑊𝐶𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  
 
DAA Failure 
Rate = 
P(LoWC 
occurs | Alert 
was issued) 
 
Proportion of alerts that eventually failed to avoid LoWC among 
all alerts (with/without a maneuver) = 
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑊𝐶𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠  
 
Resolution 
Maneuver 
Failure Rate 
= P(Failed 
Resolution | 
Resolution 
was issued) 
Proportion of resolutions that failed to avoid LoWC among all 
commanded resolutions = 
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑊𝐶𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  
Missed 
Resolution 
Rate = P(No 
resolution was 
executed | 
Alert was 
issued) 
 
Proportion of alerts that a resolution maneuver was not 
commanded among all alerts issued (due to pilot response time 
or no resolution found given situation or false alert) = 
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠  
Unnecessary 
Resolution 
Rate = 
P(Unnecessary 
maneuvers | 
All issued 
resolutions) 
 
Proportion of unnecessary resolutions due to false positive 
alerts among all issued resolutions = 
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  
Time until 
actual LoWC at 
resolution 
execution 
times 
 Average time until actual LoWC at the time of resolution execution after pilot response delay 
P(Induced 
LoWC | All 
Actual LoWC) 
 
Proportion of LoWC induced by false alert-triggered resolutions 
among total number of actual LoWC = 
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑜𝑊𝐶 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑊𝐶  
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C. Analysis of Trade-off Between Alerting Threshold Parameters 
Alerting thresholds define the size of the alerting zone and thus affect the 
performance of DAA alerting systems. For example, if the alerting zone is too large, 
alerts will be issued much earlier before LoWC and an excessive number of 
unnecessary alerts may be generated. On the other hand, if the alerting zone is too 
small, there may not be sufficient space or time for the UAS pilot to determine and 
command a maneuver to avoid the predicted LoWC. It is not trivial to measure the 
sensitivity between alerting system parameters in a systematic way. 
This study uses a concept of Signal Detection Theory (SDT) traditionally used for 
signal detection problems and diagnostic decision-making problems in the presence of 
uncertainty.17 The SDT concept has also been used to evaluate alerting thresholds for 
TCAS systems to balance the need for timely detection, a very low rate of false negative 
alerts (missed alerts), and reduction of false positive alerts (false/nuisance alerts).18 The 
performance trade-off for alerting or diagnostic systems can be visualized and measured 
using a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)19 or System Operating Characteristic 
(SOC) curve, which is a plot of the True Positive Rate (TPR) against the False Positive 
Rate (FPR) for each alerting threshold setting as shown in Fig.3.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Schematic of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. 
 
If the alerting thresholds are set to be strict, then the FPR can be reduced, but the 
TPR will decrease as well. Conversely, if the alerting threshold is set too lenient (or 
conservative), then the TPR can be increased, but the false-positive rate will increase as 
well. Therefore, the typical optimal alerting threshold setting will be at the upper left 
corner of the ROC curve, achieving a low FPR and a high TPR. In the aviation 
application domain of alerting systems, it is common for an allowable missed alert rate 
(1-TPR) to be set (often on the order of 10-3 to 10-9) as a measurement of safety 
performance standard while verifying that the FPR is not “excessive” given its impact on 
day-to-day operations as well as its cumulative effects on pilot trust and 
nonconformance.20 
This study proposes and utilizes the ROC curve and a measure of weighted 
harmonic mean of true-positive rate and positive predictive value as a method to 
objectively measure the performance of DAA alerting systems in an efficient manner. In 
addition to the proportions of true-positive alerts, false-positive alerts, missed alerts, and 
late alerts described in this section, several other measures can be derived from those 
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conditional probabilities, such as the accuracy of the detection system and positive 
predictive value. Such measures can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of different 
alerting/detection algorithms. This can be examined by combining signal detection 
theory and Bayesian statistics.21 
 
V. Experiment Methodology 
A. Simulation Platform 
For this study, the Airspace Concept Evaluation System (ACES) fast-time simulation 
tool developed at NASA was used in evaluating the performance of DAA alerting and 
guidance system. ACES is a fast-time agent-based simulation tool that has been used to 
evaluate concepts of operation ranging from applications like traffic flow management 
and separation management to surface operations over the entire NAS.22 It provides a 
capability to simulate NAS-wide, gate-to-gate air traffic operations at local, regional, and 
national levels with medium-fidelity aircraft flight dynamics models.23 It simulates flight 
trajectories using four-degree-of-freedom aircraft models derived from the Base of 
Aircraft Data (BADA).24 Currently several UAS models such as Aerosonde Mark 4.7, 
Shadow RQ-7, Ikhana/Predator B, Reaper MQ-9, and Global Hawk have been 
implemented and verified in ACES. 
ACES also employs a model of a DAA system that provides functions to evaluate 
potential well-clear violations, to declare the time to take an action, and to initiate a 
resolution maneuver to avoid predicted LoWC. The model was developed based on the 
existing separation assurance algorithm for manned aircraft, Autoresolver algorithm,25 
which itself was modeled with controllers’ methods of separating aircraft, and was used 
in this experiment to simulate the UAS pilot’s avoidance maneuvers. A simple pilot 
model was also developed to simulate the response time of UAS pilots in detecting an 
alert, deciding a resolution maneuver, coordinating the maneuver with ATC, and 
executing the maneuver (uploading the resolution maneuver to the unmanned aircraft). 
 
B. Traffic Scenarios and UAS Missions 
ACES was used to simulate the actual flight tracks of NAS-wide historical VFR traffic 
and various proposed UAS mission profiles. Results of the simulation were used to 
investigate the encounter geometries between UAS and VFR traffic in the Class E 
transition airspace and the performance for DAA alerting and guidance systems. 
According to Aviation Accident Statistics, the class E airspace is the most critical region 
where mid-air collisions are most likely to occur between aircraft under VFR condition. 
Thus, this study is focused on the encounters between UAS and VFR traffic in Class E 
transition airspace. 
Various non-point-to-point mission profiles of UAS in controlled airspace may create 
different conflict situations (e.g., encounter geometries) between unmanned and manned 
aircraft.26 Existing aircraft encounter models do not incorporate these new UAS 
performance and mission characteristics.10 Therefore, to evaluate aircraft encounter 
characteristics for anticipated Class E and transition operations that include UAS and 
VFR aircraft, it is necessary to model UAS performing different mission profiles with 
aerodynamic characteristics of these aircraft in NAS-wide simulations. 
For this study, UAS flights conducting 18 different types of missions and historical 
VFR flights flown in Class E transition airspace across the US were included in ACES 
simulations. The 18 different UAS missions include wildfire monitoring, air quality 
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monitoring, flood inundation and stream monitoring, air taxi transport, cargo delivery, 
spill monitoring, wildlife monitoring, law enforcement, aerial imaging and mapping, point 
source emission monitoring, traffic monitoring, maritime patrol, border patrol, airborne 
pathogen tracking, and weather data collection missions. The demand and mission 
profiles were proposed and generated by Intelligent Automation, Inc. based on subject-
matter experts’ opinions and socio-economical analysis.4 
The traffic scenario used for this simulation was generated using a nation-wide 
database of VFR flight paths flown on April 4th, 2012. The database was populated from 
the historical Air Defense 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES) radar data. The 
traffic scenario contained cooperative and non-cooperative VFR flights in Class E 
airspace over a 24-hour period on the chosen day. No IFR manned aircraft were 
included in the traffic scenario since air traffic controllers have responsibility for 
separating IFR aircraft from other IFR (including UAS) aircraft. Instead, this study 
focused on investigating the encounters and interactions between IFR UAS and 
cooperative/non-cooperative VFR flights. 
In the ACES simulation, the actual VFR flight tracks from that day were played back, 
and UAS were maneuvered to avoid predicted LoWC against the VFR aircraft using the 
DAA system model. One of the inputs to ACES was a flight demand set consisting of all 
of the flights to be simulated with their aircraft type, their departure and arrival airports, 
their departure times and their flight plans. This input traffic data set created realistic 
encounters between historical VFR traffic and the proposed UAS mission profiles 
illustrated in Fig. 4. 
A DAA system software model, the Java Architecture for DAA Modeling and 
Extensibility (JADEM),27 was developed to simulate the components of DAA systems, 
including the detect, track, evaluate, prioritize, declare, determine, and command 
functions. A conflict resolution algorithm, Autoresolver-AD (AD stands for “Adapted for 
DAA systems”) was adapted from the Autoresolver algorithm25 to simulate pilots’ 
“determine” function to avoid losing well clear. This resolution determine function was 
integrated with a pilot model described in the next section. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. NAS-wide UAS mission profiles (blue lines). 
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C. Pilot Response Delay Model 
The pilot’s response time plays a significant role in successfully executing a 
maneuver to avoid the predicted LoWC before penetrating the well-clear boundary. A 
simple pilot response model was developed for this study based on human-in-the-loop 
simulations.3 Two different types of alerts, corrective alerts and warning alerts, based on 
the estimated time to LoWC were given to the pilot, and the response time was 
measured between the time of an alert and the time at which a maneuver was issued to 
the unmanned aircraft. In the experiment, the pilot response times were classified based 
on alert urgency into two groups: one for warning alerts that occurred within 25 seconds 
to LoWC and the other for corrective alerts that occurred between 25 seconds and 75 
seconds prior to LoWC. Based on the human-in-the-loop experiments, the mean pilot 
response times were 12.75 seconds for warning alerts and 20 seconds for corrective 
alerts, which requires the pilot to coordinate a resolution maneuver with the air traffic 
controller. Typically, pilots tend to respond quickly when they have little time to LoWC for 
warning alerts, and their response times for each alert type fit well into a Gamma 
distribution as shown in Fig. 5 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of pilot response time for each alert type. 
 
In fast-time simulation, a pilot response time is generated for a valid alert based on 
the predicted time to LoWC to investigate the effect of pilot response delay on how 
successfully a maneuver can be executed before LoWC occurs and how well predicted 
loss of well clear can be avoided as a function of different alerting thresholds. In this 
study, if the estimated time to LoWC upon an alert is longer than 25 sec (i.e., corrective 
alerts), a pilot response time is sampled from the Gamma distribution with the following 
parameters: shape = 3.61694, scale = 5.56326. If the estimated time to LoWC is less 25 
sec (i.e., warning alerts), a pilot response time is sampled from the Gamma distribution 
with the following parameters: shape = 3.80955, scale = 3.34685. 
D. Experiment Design 
The RTCA SC-228 working group suggests that surveillance systems of UAS include 
an onboard radar specifically to detect non-cooperative intruder aircraft, an active 
transponder (e.g., Mode A/C or Mode S) to detect transponder equipped cooperative 
aircraft, and an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) “In” system to 
receive flight information broadcasts transmitted by aircraft with ADS-B “Out” capability. 
(ADS-B “Out” will be mandated by 2020 for aircraft flying in certain controlled airspace, 
including Class A, B, C, around busy airports and above 10,000 feet.) Table 6 shows the 
values for surveillance sensor system parameters that were used in this study. It is 
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assumed that there is no uncertainty in the state information of intruders detected within 
a given surveillance volume as a baseline. 
 
Table 6. Parameter values for DAA surveillance sensor system. 
 
Surveillance System 
Parameters Onboard Radar 
Active Mode A/C or 
Mode S Transponder 
ADS-B Out 
and In 
System 
Detection Range 8 nmi 14 nmi 20 nmi 
Horizontal Field of Regard ±110° ±180° ±180° 
Vertical Field of Regard ±15° ±90° ±90° 
  
To begin, the performance of DAA systems as a function of DAA alerting time 
threshold (i.e., ETL*) was investigated with perfect generic sensor models, meaning 
there was no error in the state information of intruder aircraft. The appropriate (or 
required) settings of ETL will also depend on the detection range of the surveillance 
sensor systems and pilot’s response times.  
As shown in Table 7, the reasonable candidates for ETL threshold value (55 sec, 66 
sec, and 75 sec) and distance threshold value were selected from the recommended 
values by RTCA SC-228 as shown in Table 2, and the results of a human-in-the-loop 
experiment conducted at NASA to evaluate candidate DAA displays and algorithms. Due 
to inherent uncertainty of intruder flight intent information, the prediction performance of 
LoWC along the trajectory is affected by the distance-based alerting threshold setting, 
such as DMOD, HMD*, and h*. In this study, three different threshold values for HMD* 
and DMOD (in this study, HMD* = DMOD) were chosen, and the vertical separation 
threshold (h*) was fixed at the value specified in the definition of well clear in Table 1. 
 
Table 7. DAA alerting system parameters and their threshold values. 
 
DAA Alerting System Parameters Threshold Values 
Time Threshold: Estimated Time to 
LoWC (ETL*) 55, 65, and 75sec 
Distance Threshold: Horizontal Miss 
Distance (HMD*) (=DMOD) 0.66 nmi, 1 nmi, and 1.5 nmi 
 
VI. Results and Discussion 
This section presents the results of the fast-time simulation experiments just 
described. Three key analyses are presented in order to understand the relationship 
between DAA alerting and guidance system parameters and the associated 
performance metrics. The first analysis investigates the encounter geometries observed 
at the time when the DAA system first alerts a potential LoWC condition. The second 
analysis categorizes the DAA alerts according to the taxonomy presented in Tables 3 
and assesses the alerting and guidance performance metrics presented in Table 4 and 
5. The third analysis evaluates the utility of the DAA guidance in terms of its timeliness 
and effectiveness in avoiding LoWC incidents. 
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A. Analysis of Encounter Geometry at Alerting Times 
The goal of this analysis is to understand the encounter characteristics, in terms of 
relative range and bearing angle to the intruder, that unmanned aircraft are likely to have 
with cooperative and non-cooperative VFR aircraft in Class E airspace when DAA alerts 
are first issued. A surveillance system is required to have sufficient detection range and 
field of regard such that the DAA system has enough look-ahead time prior to LoWC to 
predict and avoid LoWC.  
        
  a-1) Flight Plan: ETL* = 55 sec   a-2) Flight Plan: ETL* = 65 sec    a-3) Flight Plan: ETL* = 75 sec 
      
          b-1) DR: ETL* = 55 sec              b-2) DR: ETL* = 65 sec           b-3) DR: ETL* = 75 sec 
 
Figure 6. Relative range and bearing angle for all alerts with different DAA 
threshold settings and trajectory prediction methods: a) Flight Plan prediction, b) 
Dead Reckoning prediction; Red: 0.66 nmi, Green: 1.0 nmi, Blue: 1.5 nmi. 
 
Figure 6 depicts the encounter geometries observed in terms of relative range and 
bearing angle to the intruders at the time when each DAA alert was first issued. The 
plots reflect three different DAA alerting threshold settings.  With the maximum alerting 
time threshold tested, 75 sec to predicted LoWC, 99% of all alerts for the threats were 
issued within 15 nmi of range. With the 55 sec of alerting time threshold setting, the 
relative horizontal range of threats at the time of first DAA alerts was shorter (more than 
95 % of alerts were occurred within 10 nmi) regardless of distance threshold settings. As 
expected, the distance to the threats at the time of alerts decreased as the alerting time 
threshold was decreased. However, the effect of DAA distance threshold settings (HMD* 
= 0.66 nmi, 1.0 nmi, and 1.5 nmi) on the relative range to the intruders at the time of 
alert was found to not be significant. 
B. Analysis of DAA Alerting Performance  
The second analysis explores the distribution of DAA alerting times and performance 
statistics as a function of DAA distance and time threshold values in order to investigate 
the effects of different DAA alerting thresholds and the sensitivity of the threshold 
settings on the performance and safety of DAA systems.  
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The four numbers in the confusion matrix shown in Table 2 were collected and 
analyzed. To identify the unmitigated true condition, the ownship’s flight-plan trajectory 
without any maneuvers was compared with the intruder’s actual flown trajectory. If a 
LoWC was observed between these two trajectories within a specified look-ahead time 
(120 sec for this study), then unmitigated true condition was set to True, otherwise 
False. If an alert is issued and unmitigated true condition is true, this is a true positive 
(TP) case. If alert is issued but unmitigated true condition is false, it is a false positive 
(FP) case. The false negative (FN) and true negative (TN) cases were defined similarly. 
In this study, all the intruder aircraft detected within the surveillance volume were 
considered as population (all encounter cases) to calculate the number of TN cases. The 
TN was calculated by subtracting all other cases (TP+FP+FN) from population. 
 
Figure 7. Alert rate per flight hour as a function of different DAA threshold 
settings. 
 
First, the alert rate per UAS flight hour was analyzed to identify how frequently UAS 
may disrupt ATC as shown in Fig.7. When the UAS receives a DAA alert, the UAS pilot 
may initiate coordination with ATC to maneuver to remain well clear from proximate 
aircraft or the pilot may need to make a maneuver without coordination with ATC if it is 
an emergency situation. If the pilot is required to coordinate a resolution maneuver with 
ATC to resolve a predicted LoWC, each DAA alert may cause a disruption to the 
controller’s operations. In the simulation results, DAA alert rate per UAS flight hour was 
very low; ranging from 0.04 to 0.1 as a function of DAA alerting threshold settings. It 
means that UAS got one DAA alert every 10 to 25 hours based on the DAA alerting 
threshold settings. This result implies that the frequency with which UAS pilots may be 
expected to disrupt ATC to coordinate a maneuver responding to a DAA alert may be 
acceptably low. The alerting distance threshold has a stronger effect on the alert rate: 
the alert rate increases sharply as the distance threshold increases. However, it appears 
that the time threshold and trajectory prediction method have little effect on the alert rate, 
even though it was expected that the alert rate may decrease if the FP trajectory 
prediction method is used since it may predict potential LoWC more accurately. 
Interestingly, the true positive alert rate per UAS flight hour is constant across DAA 
alerting distance and time threshold settings, while higher rate of false positive alerts 
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were observed for larger distance thresholds. Therefore, it is important to note that there 
is a negative effect of increasing alerting distance threshold because it creates a much 
higher rate of false positive alerts with relatively constant rate of true positive alerts. 
To examine how the alerting threshold settings affect the alert lead time, DAA alerts 
were categorized into three different types based on the lead time prior to LoWC at the 
time of alert: On-time alerts, Warning alerts, and Delayed alerts. On-time alerts were 
those triggered within 10 seconds after the specified DAA alerting time threshold. 
Warning alerts were those triggered within 25 seconds prior to LoWC. Delayed alerts 
were those triggered between 10 seconds after the specified alerting time threshold and 
before 25 seconds prior to LoWC. Figure 8 shows that increasing the alerting distance 
threshold correlated with a reduced proportion of warning alerts, which may increase a 
risk of losing well clear by providing a relatively short period of time to pilots prior to 
LoWC. The alerting time threshold had relatively little effect on the alerting time; the 
proportion of delayed alerts was higher, while the proportion of on-time alerts was lower 
as the alerting time threshold was increased. Therefore, it is important to note that a 
longer alerting time threshold does not guarantee a longer alert lead time (i.e., longer 
remaining time to LoWC at the time of alerts) to pilots. On the other hand, the trajectory 
prediction method did appear to have an effect on the proportion of on-time alerts; the 
FP-based trajectory prediction method generated more on-time alerts than the DR-
based trajectory prediction method. 
 
Figure 8. Proportion of each alert type based on alerting time. 
 
Figure 9 shows the proportion of true positive alerts among all alerts as a function of 
the time threshold (ETL*) and distance threshold (HMD* and DMOD) settings. This 
probability (i.e., positive predictive value as shown in Table 3) represents a precision of 
alerting system in the SDT, which shows how accurately given alerts predict actual 
LoWC event (i.e., proportion of true positive alerts to all issued alerts). It was found that 
the distance-based DAA alerting threshold had a significant effect on the precision of the 
DAA alerting system. For both the FP and DR trajectory prediction methods, the positive 
predictive value decreased significantly from 60% with the distance threshold of 0.66 nmi 
(no buffer on LoWC boundary) to 20% with the largest distance threshold of 1.5 nmi 
because the number of false positive alerts increased significantly as the distance 
threshold increased. Based on this plot, the smaller distance and time thresholds can 
improve the precision of the alerting system. However, the precision measurement, 
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positive predictive value, does not reflect how accurately the alerting system actually 
detects or misses given true LoWC events. Therefore, the true positive rate or missed 
alert rate should be also considered to measure the overall performance of the alerting 
system. 
 
Figure 9. Proportion of true positive alerts to all issued alerts as a function of 
different DAA threshold settings. 
 
There is also a difference between DR and FP trajectory prediction methods on the 
precision of the DAA alerting system. The effect of the alerting time threshold on the 
precision is relatively smaller than that of the alerting distance threshold because the 
uncertainty of the predicted future trajectory decreases as the time to LoWC at DAA 
alerts approaches to actual LoWC. If the remaining time to LoWC at DAA alert is short, 
there is less chance for the threat aircraft to change its flight trajectory. Similarly, as 
expected, the proportion of false positive alerts to all issued alerts increases as the time 
to LoWC at alerts gets longer due to greater trajectory prediction uncertainty when a 
DAA system predicts a potential LoWC further in advance. Thus, if the alerting time 
threshold is set to a much smaller or larger value, then the effect of the time threshold 
will be increased. 
One of the factors affecting the performance of the alerting system is the alert lead 
times until actual LoWC at the time of alerts as described in previous sections. Figure 10 
shows the average time between the DAA alert and the actual LoWC as a function of 
DAA alerting threshold settings. The distance threshold settings had a noticeable effect, 
but the time threshold settings had little effect on the actual time to LoWC. The average 
lead time to actual LoWC increased by 20 seconds as the distance threshold (HMD* and 
DMOD) was increased from 0.66 nmi to 1.5 nmi. The FP-based trajectory prediction 
method provides more alerting lead time (about 7 seconds) than the DR prediction 
method, although the effect was relatively small. 
Figure 11 shows the proportion of false negative (missed alert rate), which 
represents the cases where an alert was not issued until LoWC occurred. It can be 
observed that the alerting distance threshold setting had a significant effect on the 
missed alert rate. The missed alert rate was significantly lower even with 50% increase 
of the distance threshold value. However, the effect of the distance threshold remains 
constant even with the larger value of the distance threshold. When there was no buffer 
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on LoWC boundary (HMD* and DMOD = 0.66 nmi), the proportion of missed alerts was 
significantly less with flight-plan based trajectory prediction, but there was little effect of 
trajectory prediction method when the alerting distance threshold value was larger than 
1.0 nmi. 
 
Figure 10. Average time to LoWC as a function of different DAA alerting 
thresholds (for true positive alerts). 
 
 
Figure 11. Proportion of false negative alerts to all positive condition cases (i.e., 
missed alert rate). 
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The ROC curve was created based on 9 different combinations of alerting threshold 
parameters for each trajectory prediction method as in Fig.12. All the data points were 
located in the upper left corner of the ROC curve, which indicates that the alerting 
system performs promisingly since the TPR is close to 1 and the FPR is close to 0. The 
different colors represent different alerting distance threshold settings (HMD* = 0.66, 1.0, 
and 1.5 nmi) and the different shapes indicate different alerting time threshold settings 
(Predicted time to LoWC = 55, 65, and 75 sec). There were no noteworthy differences 
between the two prediction methods and between the time thresholds. However, the 
alerting distance threshold settings had a significant effect on the TPR. When the 
alerting distance threshold was set to 0.66 nmi, the TPR is below 0.9; however, it went 
up to 0.98 when the threshold was set to 1.0 nmi (roughly 50% of increase of HMD*), 
while the FPR was increased by only 0.005. Interestingly, when the alerting distance 
threshold was increased by more than 100%, the effect became worse than the 50%-
increased distance threshold since there was no difference in the TPR, but the FPR was 
increased. This ROC analysis found that the alerting distance parameters such as HMD* 
and DMOD is a key parameter that can improve the overall DAA system's alerting 
performance among the three parameters (trajectory prediction method, alerting 
distance parameter, and time parameter) investigated in this study. With a slightly 
conservative threshold of the alerting system, there might be less missed alerts at the 
expense of increasing false alerts. Among three distance settings (i.e., 0.66, 1.0 and 1.5 
nmi), the best value of the threshold was 1.0 nmi providing both lower FPR and higher 
TPR than other distance threshold setting. 
 
Figure 12. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) plots with different alerting 
threshold settings. 
 
However, it is important to note that the FPR was extremely low (lower than 0.02) 
while the TPR was relatively high (higher than 0.85) on every DAA alerting threshold 
settings. In this study, all pairs of UAS ownship aircraft and intruder VFR aircraft 
detected by the surveillance volume of ownship aircraft were considered as total number 
of cases to be evaluated. The total number of pairs that were evaluated for each alerting 
threshold setting was about 270,000, which means 10 intruders were detected within the 
surveillance volume on average during the flight of each UAS. It was shown that total 
number of true positive condition cases was less than 1% of total true negative condition 
cases since the LoWC occurs extremely rarely as shown in Fig. 7. This means that a 
large portion of intruder aircraft detected by UAS surveillance volume are not potential 
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threats that may cause a loss of well clear. Therefore, it was difficult to distinguish the 
performance of alerting thresholds based on very low rate of false alerts. 
For those cases where the number of true positive conditions is much smaller than 
the number of true negative conditions, the better prediction performance could be 
calculated by removing the effect of true negative cases.28 One of metrics widely used in 
this case is Fβ Score (also known as F-Measure).29 This metric is the weighted harmonic 
mean of true positive rate and positive predictive value, and a higher score represent a 
better performance. If β is 1, it’s the balanced harmonic mean, that is, the true positive 
rate and positive predictive value have the equal weight. However, generally one has 
more weight over the other and different weight rates are used for different prediction 
systems based on its characteristics. For the DAA’s alerting system, true positive (true 
alert) and false negative (missed alert) are much more important than false positive 
(false/nuisance alert). Therefore, β was set to 5 for the experiments in this study under 
the assumption that true positive and false negative are at least 5 times more important 
than false positive. The Fβ Score is defined as 
 𝐹! =   1 + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝛽! ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 +  𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
                           =  1 + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒1 + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 +  𝛽! ∙ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 +  𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  , (5) 
 
 
Figure 13.  Fβ Score analysis: The β value represents the weight on true positive 
(true alert) and false negative (missed alert) over false positive (false/nuisance 
alert). Here, β is set to 5, which means that true alert/missed alert has 5 times 
more weights than false alert to measure the alerting performance. 
 
Figure 13 illustrates the Fβ Scores for the 18 different parameter settings. Each curve 
in Fig. 13 is a cubic spline that smooths the changes in F-Score as the alerting distance 
threshold increases for each alerting time threshold setting.	This figure shows that the 
alerting distance threshold made significant effects on the scores, while the other two 
parameters do not give big impacts on the scores. Even though the trajectory prediction 
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method made an effect when the distance threshold is set to 0.66 nmi and the time 
threshold did when the distance threshold is set to 1.5 nmi, they are specific cases. The 
main general trend is that the score is increasing when the distance threshold increases 
to 1.0 nmi but it is decreasing when the distance threshold increases further. When the 
distance threshold increased to 1.0 nmi, true positive significantly increased and false 
negative decreased accordingly. Therefore, there was a big jump for the Fβ Score. When 
the distance threshold increased further, false positive increased rapidly but there was 
no noteworthy changes in true positive and false negative. This led the score to go down 
again. Based on this result, 1.0 nmi is the best value for the distance threshold among 
three values tested in the experiments. 
 
C. Analysis of DAA Guidance Performance 
As described, the DAA alert should be given with sufficient timeframe in order for 
UAS pilot to aware situation, determine a maneuver to avoid the predicted LoWC, 
coordinate the maneuver with ATC, and command the maneuver to unmanned aircraft 
via communication links. If the pilot takes a long time to perform the series of actions, the 
unmanned aircraft may not be able to avoid the predicted LoWC even though DAA alerts 
were given on time. Therefore, this study investigates the effect of UAS pilot response 
delay on the performance of DAA guidance systems. For example, the proportion of 
LoWC that cannot be resolved when there is a pilot response delay after DAA alerts is 
measured to see the impact of pilot delay. 
 Figure 14 shows the proportion of successful resolutions, failed resolutions, and 
missed resolution as a function of alert times (given all true positive alerts). “Missed 
resolution” means just a case where a loss of well clear defined by the alerting logic was 
already violated at the time of maneuver after a pilot delay, thus any resolution 
maneuver could not be executed. “Failed resolution” means that a resolution maneuver 
was executed, but failed to avoid actual loss of well clear and “Successful resolution” 
means that a resolution maneuver was executed and successfully avoided LoWC. 
 
Figure 14. Proportion of successful resolutions, failed resolutions, and missed 
resolutions to all true positive alerts as a function of DAA alert times. 
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As alert lead time gets shorter, the proportion of successful resolutions decreases 
and the proportion of failed resolutions which eventually resulted in LoWC increases as 
expected. When the remaining time to LoWC at DAA alerts was smaller than 15 
seconds, the successful resolution rate dropped noticeably (below 15%) and the missed 
resolution rate, in which a resolution maneuver could not be executed due to pilot 
response delay, increased significantly (went up to more than 70%) resulting in LoWC 
eventually. Therefore, minimum or average alert lead time prior to LoWC should be 
specified as a requirement in the MOPS. If a DAA alerting system is required to avoid 
more than 70% of LoWC, the minimum time should be longer than 45 seconds and at 
least 65 seconds for resolving more than 90% of LoWC given true positive alerts. 
However, the true positive rate and the false positive rate should also be considered in 
evaluating the required or desirable DAA alerting threshold settings as described in 
previous sections. 
UAS pilots take time to respond to DAA alerts as described earlier. The pilot may not 
be able to command/execute a resolution maneuver before penetrating LoWC boundary 
and the resolution success rate will be significantly dependent upon when a resolution 
maneuver is executed. Figure 15 shows the average remaining time to actual loss of 
well clear at the time of commanding a resolution maneuver after pilot response delay 
for given true positive alerts. As the alerting distance and time thresholds increase, it 
provides much longer remaining time to actual loss of well clear after pilot response 
delay. When FP trajectory prediction method is used, it also provides longer remaining 
time than DR prediction method is used. Specifically, it appears that the effect of alerting 
distance threshold is much bigger than the one of alerting time threshold on the mean 
remaining time at the time of resolution execution. To provide UAS pilot more sufficient 
time at the time of commanding a maneuver prior to actual loss of well clear, therefore, 
the alerting distance and time threshold should be set larger. 
 
 
Figure 15. Mean time until actual loss of well clear at the time of resolution 
execution after pilot response delay as a function of different DAA alerting 
thresholds. 
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Based on the remaining time until actual loss of well clear after pilot response delay, 
a DAA guidance maneuver can be executed or missed. Based on RTCA SC-228 draft 
MOPS document, UAS pilots requires approximately minimum 15 seconds prior to 
LoWC to successfully remain well clear without ATC coordination. Therefore, it might be 
too late to execute a maneuver to remain well clear if the remaining time to actual loss of 
well clear at the time of resolution execution is less than 15 seconds. The timing of 
actual resolution maneuvers executed given a DAA alerting threshold setting were 
examined to see if and when a DAA guidance maneuver was executed as shown in 
Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16. Proportion of resolutions based on the time to actual LoWC at 
resolution execution times after pilot response delay. 
 
Much smaller percentage of resolutions were executed before 15 seconds prior to 
actual loss of well clear when the alerting threshold settings were set with smaller 
distance and time threshold values. For example, only 40% of resolutions were executed 
before 15 seconds prior to actual loss of well clear when the distance threshold was 0.66 
nmi and the time threshold was 55 seconds. There was also the effect of trajectory 
prediction method on the resolution execution times. With the FP-based trajectory 
prediction method, a resolution maneuver can be executed much earlier than the DR-
based trajectory prediction method. The effect of trajectory prediction method was bigger 
with smaller alerting distance threshold value. Therefore, a larger alerting distance 
threshold allows pilots to execute a resolution maneuver much earlier so that the 
proportion of missed resolution can be reduced. 
Figure 17 shows the proportion of successful resolutions, which actually avoided the 
predicted loss of well clear, as a function of resolution execution times. Interestingly, the 
success rate is more than 80% when a resolution maneuver is executed at least 15 
seconds before LoWC occurs, and the success rate is still greater than 60% even 
though a resolution maneuver is executed less than 15 seconds before LoWC occurs. 
Therefore, it would be better if DAA alerting and guidance system will be able to support 
UAS pilots commanding and executing a resolution maneuver at least 15 seconds 
before LoWC occurs to increase success resolution rate. 
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Figure 17. Proportion of successful resolutions as a function of resolution 
execution times.  
 
However, there are still LoWC that were not avoided even though there is sufficient 
time to LoWC at the time of resolution execution (e.g., 10% failed resolutions when a 
resolution maneuver was executed between 65 seconds and 75 seconds before LoWC). 
A potential reason is that the actual LoWC occurred much earlier than the predicted 
LoWC due to sudden acceleration of the intruder into the ownship or DAA guidance 
algorithm could not find a conflict-free resolution maneuver for the look-ahead time 
period given encounter geometry and aircraft performance. Further analysis is required 
to find out the reasons in future research. 
As mentioned in previous section, false positive alerts may cause unnecessary 
resolution maneuvers, which means there would not have seen a LoWC even if no 
action was taken, and also cause interruptions to ATC to coordinate the maneuvers. 
This will also affect the performance/behavior of pilots such as the pilot’s compliance on 
the DAA alerting system. Previous research that has been conducted regarding the 
relationships between false positive alerts and operator trust and use of automation 
indicated that false alerts lead to a distrust, or disuse in the alerting system, resulting in 
disregarding or responding late to some true positive alerts.30, 31 
The false positive alerts seem to remain until the pilot determines a resolution 
because the pilot model executed the maneuver to the unmanned aircraft after the pilot 
response delay. This means the DAA alerts can last for a while even when they are false 
positive alerts. Therefore, it will be difficult to discriminate between false positive alerts 
and true positive alerts at the time of alerts based on the duration of alerting time. Such 
alerts are more likely to trigger a maneuver even after a pilot delay. Figure 18 shows the 
proportion of unnecessary resolutions that are triggered by false/nuisance alerts to all 
resolutions as a function of DAA alerting threshold settings. The resolutions that were 
executed due to false positive alerts were considered as unnecessary resolutions among 
all executed resolutions (it is called “false alert-induced resolution”) in this study. The 
proportion of false alert-induced resolutions increases significantly (up to 70% of 
resolutions) as the alerting distance threshold increases, since false positive alerts 
increase significantly as the distance threshold increases, but the effect of DAA time 
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threshold and trajectory prediction method is relatively small. The false alert-induced 
response can be quite disruptive to pilot’s tasks and air traffic controllers as a result of 
carrying out the unnecessary resolution maneuvers. The resolution maneuvers triggered 
by false alerts can be “acceptable” or actually “unnecessary” based on the effects of the 
false alert-induced resolutions on the safety in terms of the proximity between aircraft 
and on the severity of disruption to ATC and UAS pilot tasks.32 Further research is 
required to investigate how false alert-induced resolutions affect pilot’s trust and 
compliance and the positive and negative effects of “acceptable” and “unnecessary” 
false alerts. 
 
 
Figure 18. Proportion of unnecessary resolutions triggered by false positive alerts 
to all executed resolutions. 
 
Figure 19 shows the proportion of LoWC induced by unnecessary resolutions due to 
false positive alerts to all actual losses of well clear. Among all unnecessary resolutions, 
the cases where resulted in actual LoWC were counted as the induced LoWC. The 
induced LoWC increases significantly as the alerting distance threshold increases 
because there are more false positive alerts with larger distance threshold. It was also 
found that the number of false positive alerts correlates strongly with the LoWCs induced 
by resolutions due to false positive alerts. The correlation between the total number of 
false positive alerts and the number of induced LoWC was 0.93 and statistically 
significant (<0.0001*). It shows that there is negative effect of false positive alerts in 
terms of induced LoWC in addition to the effects of false positive alerts on pilot 
performance and reliance on the alerting system. Therefore, it would be important to 
reduce the number of unnecessary false positive alerts in setting the appropriate DAA 
alerting threshold values. 
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Figure 19. Proportion of induced LoWC to all actual LoWC. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
DAA systems are intended to support the remote pilot at the UAS ground control 
station in keeping his/her aircraft “well clear” of proximate airborne traffic in a manner 
that preserves the safety of the airspace and the efficiency of the air traffic system. This 
study investigated the effects of alerting criteria and pilot response delay on the safety 
and performance of UAS DAA systems in the context of routine civil UAS operations in 
the National Airspace System (NAS).  
The performance of DAA system alerting and guidance functions was assessed with 
a large number of encounters and a broad set of alerting and guidance system 
parameters using a fast-time, NAS-wide simulation tool. Three attributes of the DAA 
system were controlled as independent variables in the study to conduct trade-off 
analyses: UAS trajectory prediction method (dead-reckoning vs. intent-based), alerting 
time threshold (related to predicted time to LoWC), and alerting distance threshold 
(related to predicted Horizontal Miss Distance). Specifically, the overall performance of 
DAA system alerting and guidance functions was evaluated in terms of its ability to 
accurately predict potential losses of well clear with sufficient lead time such that the 
UAS pilot is able to evaluate the encounter threat, determine an effective maneuver, 
coordinate with ATC and initiate the selected maneuver to successfully avoid the 
predicted loss of well clear.  
To evaluate the accuracy performance of a DAA system alerting function, the 
positive predictive value—the proportion of true positive alerts to all issued alerts—was 
measured. This metric was mainly affected by the alerting distance threshold. Results 
indicated DAA alerting distance threshold had a greater effect on DAA system 
performance than either DAA alerting time threshold or ownship trajectory prediction 
method. It showed that increased distance thresholds were correlated with more false 
positive alerts but also longer alert lead times. The distance threshold settings had a 
noticeable effect on the average time to actual LoWC from initial DAA alerts.  
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Another important metric is the proportion of missed alerts (false negative alerts) 
since it adversely affects safety, potentially leading to a mid-air collision. Results 
indicated the missed alert rate dropped significantly from ~11 % to ~2 % when the 
alerting distance threshold increased from 0.66 nmi to 1.0 nmi. However, no significant 
differences were observed for further increase in the distance threshold. While increased 
distance thresholds had beneficial effects on alert lead time and missed alert rate, they 
also resulted in higher false alert rates. In the design and development of DAA systems, 
therefore, the positive and negative effects of false alerts and missed alerts should be 
carefully balanced to achieve acceptable alerting system performance. 
In an effort to determine desirable alerting parameter settings in a systematic 
manner, ROC curves showing the trade-offs between missed alert rate and false alert 
rate were computed for the alerting system parameter sets used in this study, but they 
did not draw meaningful distinctions between those parameter sets. An F-score metric— 
a weighted harmonic mean of true positive rate and positive predictive value—was found 
to be useful in selecting an optimal (or acceptable) set of DAA alerting thresholds. 
Results indicated that the F-score was sensitive to changes in the alerting distance 
threshold but was insensitive to changes in the alerting time threshold. Although the F-
score could provide a single quantitative number for measuring the DAA alerting 
performance, it is important to choose an appropriate value for the beta (β) parameter 
used in calculating the F-score. Therefore, subject-matter experts should be consulted to 
identify an appropriate beta value, and the trade-off between different beta values should 
also be investigated in future research. 
Analysis on the alert lead time was conducted to evaluate the timeliness of DAA 
system alerts. As expected, results indicated a strong positive correlation between alert 
lead time and DAA system performance (i.e., the ability of the UAS pilot to maneuver the 
unmanned aircraft to remain well clear). When the alerting distance threshold was 
increased from 0.66 nmi to 1.5 nmi, the average time to actual LoWC was increased by 
20 seconds, which suggests that the DAA alerting system will give more lead time to the 
pilot by increasing the distance threshold at the expense of a higher false alert 
rate. Varying the alert time threshold parameter had little effect on average alert lead 
time. 
In conclusion, the DAA alerting distance threshold parameter has a key role in 
reducing missed alerts and increasing alert lead time, as compared to either the alerting 
time threshold parameter or the ownship trajectory prediction method. While increased 
distance thresholds have beneficial effects on alert lead time and missed alert rate, they 
also generate higher false alert rates. The simulation results and analysis methodology 
presented in this study are expected to help system designers/developers and standards 
groups evaluate and determine the required or appropriate setting of DAA system 
parameter thresholds for UAS that ensure safety while minimizing operational impacts to 
the NAS before DAA operational performance standards can be finalized.  
Additional research is needed to determine a methodology for setting alerting system 
parameters to achieve an optimal (or acceptable) balance between false positive alerts 
and missed alerts in the design and development of DAA alerting and guidance systems. 
Future studies should include analysis of induced LoWCs (resulting from false positive 
alerts) and “missed” resolutions resulting from untimely alerts and/or excessive pilot 
response delay. Human-in-the-loop studies may be necessary to assess the impact of 
false and missed alerts on UAS pilot trust and response in the DAA system alerting and 
guidance. Lastly, future work is warranted to evaluate the effect of surveillance sensor 
uncertainty on DAA system performance and to determine an effective concept of 
interoperability between UAS DAA systems and existing collision avoidance systems 
operating in the NAS (e.g., TCAS II). 
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